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The (New) Ethics of Collaborative Law
By Scott R. Peppet
Buddhist, sometimes Sufi-a group of blind men examn
an an
ancient
parable-sometimes
sometimes
says that
trunk and
One touches theHindu,
ines
elephant.
an elephant is like a snake. One touches the legs and says
that an elephant is like a tree. One touches the tail and
says that an elephant is like a rope.
None is wrong, but none is right.
This article argues that we have subjected collaborative law to a similar process, with a similar result.' There
are radically different understandings of what collaborative law is, and therefore there remain fundamentally
opposed beliefs about whether it can comply with the legal
ethics rules. In February 2007, for example, the State of
Colorado's legal ethics committee issued Opinion 115,
which for the first time held that collaborative law creates a per se impermissible and unwaivable conflict of
interest for lawyers. Then, in August, the American Bar
Association's ethics committee issued Opinion 447,
which attempted to rebut Colorado's understanding and
argued that collaborative law creates no ethical problems.

In my view, neither of these opinions has it right-but
neither has it entirely wrong either. To understand why, we
must examine how these opinions characterize the collaborative law process-what part of the elephant they were
examining. I argue that these committees understood the
process quite differently and thus reached very different
conclusions about its ethical implications. To help clean up
the mess they've left, I provide a taxonomy of contractual
arrangementsthat collaborative lawyers use in effecting
their practice and show that these different contractual
setups have different ethical consequences.
Most fundamentally, my goal is to warn collaborative
law practitioners against rejoicing prematurely about the
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ABA's Opinion 447 or assuming that it completely vindicates their practice and frees them from ethical scrutiny.
Just the opposite. Careful analysis of both Opinion 115
and Opinion 447 underscores the need for collaborative
law practitioners to deepen their understanding of the
ethical complications of collaborative law and to make
modifications to lessen the ethical risks. The lesson of
2007 should be that in undertaking this ingenious experiment, we need to be cautious, not careless, in order to
prevent more tumult and confusion.
Conflicting Opinions: Colorado's Opinion 115
and the ABA's Opinion 447
Prior to 2007, the ethics committees of five statesKentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, and
Pennsylvania-had addressed the propriety of collaborative
law, and all had found it in compliance with their legal
ethics codes. Three states-California, North Carolina, and
Texas-had passed statutes codifying the practice.' At the same
time, some practitioners and collaborative law scholars-myself
included-have expressed reservations about whether the practiceW
complies fully with the existing
rules of ethics.3
In February, however, the sense
of an emerging permissive consensus came to an abrupt end. The
Colorado Bar Association's Ethics
Committee issued Opinion 115,
holding that collaborative law creates a per se conflict of interest
under Colorado's Rule 1.7.4 The
opinion focused on the "four-way
agreement" that is often signed at
the start of collaborative law
between the two lawyers and the two clients:
[t]he touchstone of Collaborative Law is an advance
agreement, often referred to as a "Four-Way Agreement"
or "Participation Agreement," entered into by the parties
and the lawyers in their individual capacities, which
requires the lawyers to terminate their representations in
the event the process is unsuccessful and the matter must
proceed to litigation.

the limitation on the lawyer's ability to go to court:
inevitably interferes with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering the alternative of litigation in a material way. Indeed, this course of action that
"reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client,"
or
at least considered, is foreclosed to the lawyer.'
It therefore found a per se violation of Rule 1.7.
The dispute resolution community erupted in dissent,
arguing in print, on the Internet, and in conferences that
Opinion 115 was fundamentally misguided. Practitioners
feared that this was the beginning of a cascade of such
decisions.
Just six months after Opinion 115 was released, the
American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a responseits own Formal Opinion 447, titled "Ethical Considerations in Collaborative Law Practice." Opinion 447
rejected the Colorado committee's conclusions and held that
the practice creates no impermissible conflict.
Instead, Opinion 447 argued
that although a four-way agree-

hat is the process of

third person on the part of each

live law,

opinion go it

Because of this contract, the committee found, "Collaborative Law, by definition, involves an agreement between
the lawyer and a 'third person' (i.e., the opposing party)
whereby the lawyer agrees to impair his or her ability
to represent the client."6 This necessarily implicates
Colorado's conflict of interest rules, in particular Rule
1.7(b), which states that "[a] lawyer shall not represent a
client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ...a third
person," unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely affected and the client
consents after consultation.7 Opinion 115 then found that
24 WINTER 2008 DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE

ment does create obligations to a
lawyer, such obligations create

no

conflict if they do not "materially

limit the lawyer's representation of
the client."' It then concluded that
a collaborative law four-way agreement disqualifying each lawyer in
the event either client proceeds to
litigation does not so "materially
limit" the lawyers' service because
each collaborative lawyer's repre-

sentation is already limited in scope
to settlement, and thus the fourway does not further limit that representation:
When a client has given informed consent to a representation limited to collaborative negotiation toward settlement, the lawyer's agreement to withdraw if the
collaboration fails is not an agreement that impairs her
ability to represent the client, but rather is consistent
with the client's limited goals for the representation."
In other words, "no conflict arises" under Rule 1.7:
"there is no foreclosing of alternatives ... otherwise
available to the client because the client has specifically limited the scope of the lawyer's representationto the collaborative

negotiation of a settlement."'
This is a very different understanding of the process
from that of the Colorado committee. Colorado's Opinion
115 is premised on one understanding of the collaborative
law process-that the process is effected by a four-way
contract, signed by both lawyers and both clients, that
includes disqualification; that the lawyers enter that contract in their "individual capacities" (that they are, in
short, in privity); and that this four-way contract is the

only effecting document. In other words, what the
Colorado opinion found suspect was a situation in which
the only agreement in play was a four-way contract.
The ABA, on the other hand, describes a different elephant. Its analysis turns on the assumption that in addition
to the four-way agreement, there is a separate limited
retention or limited scope agreement in place between
each lawyer and his or her client. As understood by the
ABA, in other words, collaborative lawyers get informed
consent from their clients to limit the scope of their representation to settlement, and then sign a four-way document that simply reaffirms that preexisting commitment.
It thus found no ethical problem-because it was looking
at a very different contractual scenario from that considered by Colorado's committee.
A Taxonomy of Contractual Arrangements
So, which is it? What is the process of collaborative law,
and, thus, which opinion got it right? The answer to this
question is surprisingly complicated. Although many
scholars and practitioners have
long assumed that we understood
the elephant accurately, I am
now convinced that we have all
been recognizing only parts of

the whole.
As the collaborative law
process has evolved, collaborative
lawyers have created a disparate
array of contractual arrangements

to give it force. To understand
the conflict between these com-

peting ethics opinions-and to
bring clarity to how collaborative

Only situation, but they also sign a four-way document.
There are, however, several variations in practice of this
four-way:
- It may be a process four-way, containing only process
terms such as commitments to disclosure, honesty, communication norms, etc., or a disqualificationfour-way, containing the mandatory attorney withdrawal language.
e It may be contractual, clearly intended as a binding set
of contractual obligations giving rise to the possibility of
liability or injunction, or hortative, intended instead as a
statement of non-binding principle or belief, rather than
legal obligation.
e If and only if it is contractual in nature, it may represent
an intent to bind the clients only, where only the clients
and not their lawyers are contracting parties, or to include
lawyers in privity, where the attorneys are in privity either
with each other or with the opposing client, or both, and
thus contractually bound by the agreement.
These three variables give rise to very different documents, with very different consequences. Many collaborative lawyers, for example, seem
to practice in a "Retention
Agreements Plus Hortative
Disqualification Four-Way"

Are the attorneys
nitratual
p es in priviy? Tils
is an intri
vexing,

lawyers should practice going
forward-I believe we must begin
to see these very different arrangements distinctly. Here I lay out
three fundamentally different scenarios, some
with multiple variations, which are all currently
called "collaborative law."
First, in a Retention Agreements Only scenario, the two
lawyer-client pairs reach limited retention agreements
that include a provision making attorney withdrawal
mandatory in the event that either party proceeds to
court. They do not sign a four-way agreement, however.
Thus, if one party litigates, both lawyers can (and should)
withdraw. Note, however, that if Lawyer B and Client B
decide to go to court together anyway, there is nothing
that Lawyer A or Client A can do. They have reached
only "behind the table" lawyer-client agreements; there is
no enforceable "across the table" contract that the "A"
side could use to enforce the collaborative law commitment to withdrawal.
Second, in a Retention Agreements Plus Four-Way scenario, the lawyers and clients create limited retention
agreements similar to those in a Retention Agreements

arrangement. They sign limited
retention agreements with their
respective clients and then a fourway with the other side, but the
four-way does not use contractual
language. These four-ways are

often titled "Principles and
Guidelines for the Practice of
Collaborative Law" and are

phrased as such rather than as
contracts. These hortative four-

ways do not contain various terms
one would expect in a contractsuch as choice of law, jurisdictional, damages, or dispute resolution provisions-nor do they
sound like contracts.
Neither the ABA's nor Colorado's analysis applies
squarely to this form of collaborative law practice. If the
parties sign a hortative four-way, then no formal contractual
conflict of interest arises-the lawyers have not taken on
contractual obligations to the other side. Instead, the
process rests entirely on the limited retention agreements.
The relevant ethical question is whether those limited
retention agreements have complied with Model Rule 1.2's
requirements for scope reduction agreements-whether, in
short, there is true informed consent. Conflicts of interest
are not the salient issue. Unfortunately, neither Colorado's
Opinion 115 nor the ABAs Opinion 447 discussed compliance with Rule 1.2 in detail.
Other collaborative lawyers, however, do seem to
intend their four-way agreements as contractual, and
some may even intend for both the lawyers and clients to
be in privity to those contracts. The Collaborative Law
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Alliance of New Hampshire's model four-way form, for
example, is titled "Agreement to the Principles and
Guidelines of Collaborative Law," and it contains more
contractual language than the four-ways discussed above.3
The Cincinnati Academy of Collaborative Professionals
uses a form titled "Collaboration Contract," which states
that "[t]he Participants agree to be bound by the terms of
this Contract." 4 Although I have not completed my search,
I have also found other agreements that seem clearly
intended to be contractual rather than hortative.
What difference does it make? First, a contractual fourway gives rise to the ability for Lawyer A or Client A to
force Lawyer B and Client B to live up to their collaborative commitments. If Lawyer B and Client B decide to
revise their understanding and go to court together, the
"A" side can sue on the four-way
contract. Gaining this feature,
however, comes with increased
ethical risk-by signing an agreement with the other side, the

lawyers create the possibility of a
formal conflict of interest if the

lawyers are in privity.
Are the attorneys truly contractual parties in privity? This is

an intriguing, and vexing, question. I have found only one collaborative law four-way agreement
that explicitly discusses lawyer
privity, and it states that "[t]his
Collaboration Contract does not
create any legal rights or privity of
contract between the non-client
Participant and the other attor-

the parties only sign a four-way. Again, that four-way may
concern only process or also disqualification, may be hortative or contractual, and may be clients-only or include
lawyers in privity. These distinctions matter a great deal for
the ethical analysis. As already stated, the Colorado committee characterized the collaborative law process as involving
only a four-way document, and it assumed both that such an
agreement was contractual and that the lawyers would be parties to it. It found this a per se conflict of interest. At the
same time, Colorado's Opinion 115 also stated clearly that a
process-ratherthan disqualification-four-way only scenario, otherwise known as "Cooperative Law," complies with
the ethics rules. It also stated that a client-only (no lawyers)
agreement for disqualification also raises no ethical problem." It thus acknowledged that the issue is attorneys binding themselves to disqualification
four-ways-not the remainder of
these contractual structures.
Neither Colorado nor the ABA

Neither Col orado nor
the ABA con sidered the

considered the ethics of a "reten-

tion agreements only" structure.
Instead, both focused on four-way

agreements. Collaborative law certainly can be practiced in this

ethics of a retention
form, however, and with less ethical risk than with a contractual
agreemei its ofour-way.
structure. In stad both
What's Next?
This taxonomy of contractual
onfour-way

agreen ients.

ney."1 Note, however, that this
does not disclaim the possibility of
privity between the lawyers-just
that there is no privity between a
lawyer and the client on the other side. Most four-way
agreements appear to be silent on this question."
To the extent that the lawyers are in privity to a contractual four-way disqualification agreement, that suggests
the somewhat bizarre possibility that a lawyer could sue on
the contract-even without his or her client's support-to disqualify the other lawyer. If Lawyer B and Client B decided
to break the four-way agreement and go to court together,
and even if Client A found this acceptable, Lawyer A
would have an independent contractual right against the
"B" side. Although the notion of a lawyer having such
power independent of her client is unsettling, it is a real
possibility if collaborative lawyers use a contractual, lawyerprivity four-way document-and one that those lawyers
should be disclosing to their clients as part of getting their
clients' informed consent to the process.
This brings us to a third distinct understanding of collaborative law, which I call a Four-Way Only scenario.
Here, no separate limited retention agreements exist-
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arrangements-all commonly
understood as "collaborative
law"-reveals the source of our
confusion about the ethics of this

process. Both the Colorado ethics
committee and the American Bar
Association looked at one type of
contractual arrangement and pro-

nounced it acceptable or unacceptable. Each, however,
missed the complex reality that exists in practice. Neither
opinion therefore provides complete guidance for collaborative lawyers, nor should either be considered the "last word"
on the ethics of this dispute resolution process.
One can glean certain things from the two opinions
taken together, however, that should help collaborative
lawyers going forward.
First, collaborative lawyers need to reconsider which
contractual structure they have employed and whether it
best suits their goals and their clients' needs. Many collaborative lawyers seem not to have thought about whether
their disqualification or withdrawal provision is in a robust
lawyer-client limited retention agreement or in a four-way,
and why. Few seem to have consciously chosen a hortative
or contractual four-way, or dealt explicitly with the issue of
lawyer privity. These differences matter. Until the collaborative law community addresses these variations head-on and
practitioners decide which arrangements they really need in

order to effect their goals, they run the risk of landing in
ethical trouble unnecessarily.
Second, I believe that Opinion 115 and Opinion 447
each had it partly right. Colorado's committee was clearly
correct in saying that a client-to-client agreement (with separate lawyer-client limited retention agreements) presents
fewer ethical risks than a "four-way only" scenario in which
the four-way is a disqualification, contractual, lawyer-privity
document. The latter is, in my view, a terrible structure, and
one that I would avoid. Why the Colorado committee
focused on that structure exclusively, I cannot say, but it
doesn't much matter: some collaborative lawyers are practicing using a "four-way only" arrangement, and that is unwise.
The ABA's Opinion 447 also provides useful hints of the
way forward. The opinion clarifies that the ABA believes
even a contractual four-way document is permissible so long

as the disqualification language within it parallels identical
language already agreed upon by each lawyer and her client
in a limited retention contract. In short, a limited retention
document can moot the conflict of interest problems presented by the "four-way only" arrangement considered by the
Colorado committee.
Unfortunately, the ABAs Opinion 447 is unnecessarily
confusing about just what is required for this "solution"
to work properly. It does not discuss limited retention agreements in any detail and leaves unanswered such basic ques-

tions as (1) whether agreements must be in writing in the
collaborative law context; (2) whether a four-way document
can itself constitute the limited retention agreement, or
whether separate documents are needed; and (3) whether a
disqualifying limited retention agreement must be in place
prior to the signing of a contractual four-way in order to ameliorate conflict of interest concerns. I cannot address all of
these shortcomings here. It must suffice to say that while I
agree with Opinion 447's general argument, I would urge
collaborative law practitioners to carefully review their limited retention agreements and to focus on whether they have
documented informed consent to those important lawyerclient arrangements. If nothing else, the conflict between
Opinion 115 and Opinion 447 teaches us that collaborative
law is a creature of contract, and that it is ultimately dependent on the validity of these limited retention agreements.
Third, and finally, 2007 teaches us that collaborative
law is neither dead nor completely in the ethical clear. The
practice is innovative and ingenious, and provides great
benefits. It is also complex, and in some instances I believe
that its practitioners have "let the car outrun the headlights." As shown, some of the contractual structures in use
should be reconsidered and revised to make the practice
more consistent, and more clearly compliant, with the legal
ethics rules.

Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of
Professional Pluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475, 489 (2005) ("I have my
doubts about whether mandatory mutual withdrawal provisions can be
squared with Rule 1.2"). See also John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative
Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualificationand Process Control in a
New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1375-78 (2003).
4. 1was not on the Colorado committee, nor did I testify before it or
have anything to do with its result.
5. Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee, Ethics Opinion 115,
p.1(Feb. 24, 2007).
6. Id. at 4.
7. COLO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Rule 1.7(b). This rule is essentially identical to MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.7.
8. Opinion 115, p.4.
9. American Bar Association, Comm on Ethics and Prof'l Resp.,
Formal Opinion 07-447 (Aug. 9, 2007), at p.4.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
12. See, for example, the sample forms in SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN,
COLLABORATIVE LAW A NEW MODEL FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 390-393
(2004); PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 137-145 (2001).
13. Collaborative Law Alliance of New Hampshire, Agreement to
the Principles and Guidelines of Collaborative Law, available at
www.collaborativelawnh.org/agreement.pdf.
14. Cincinnati Academy of Collaborative Professionals,
Collaborative Contract, available at www.collaborativelaw.com/4-1
_Participation-Agreements.cfm.
15. See Id.
16. I continue to search for evidence of collaborative documents
that do address this question, and would be grateful to any who have
additional examples.
17. See Opinion 115, footnote 11.

Endnotes
1.This article is a shortened version of a more complete analysis in
law review form. See Scott R. Pepper, The (New) Ethics of Collaborative
Law, J.Disp. RESOL. (forthcoming 2008).
2. For a convenient listing of these opinions and statutes, see
www.abanet.org/dch/committee.cfm?com= DR035000.

3. See Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and
DISPUTE RESOLUTION MAGAZINE

WINTER 2008 27

